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ABSTRACT 
 The Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control and Collaboration (UTACC) 
system seeks to integrate Marines and machine in a way that does not add to the cognitive 
load of warfighters. How do machines communicate with humans and vice versa when 
they are interdependent teammates, rather than following a framework of human 
operating the robot? Key to this capability is the capacity to incorporate observability, 
predictability and directability into the interface designs. Previous research studied this 
question from a context of a Marine fireteam that had a robot as one of its members. 
Choosing the right type of interface to facilitate communications between members of a 
fireteam (be they human or machine) is essential to their ability to actually function as a 
team and trust one another. But those communications occur in the immediate proximity 
of the teammates. What changes when you seek to expand this concept beyond a small 
unit? Three essential focus areas are included in this thesis. First, what is the essential 
information required to maintain situational awareness between a UTACC fireteam and 
higher echelons of military units? In other words, this is the “what” of information being 
exchanged. Secondly, what are the interface design principles that will hold true no 
matter what type of information is being exchanged? Finally, this thesis presents 
proposed methods to evaluate these principles and the specific information exchange 
requirements. 
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This thesis is an extension of two previous Unmanned Tactical Autonomous 
Control (UTACC) theses. The thesis by Kulisz and Sharp (2017) explored MOEs and 
MOPs for the UTACC program, while the thesis by Beierl and Tschirley (2017) evaluated 
situation awareness (SA) for the UTACC program. This thesis will evaluate methods to 
team humans and machines on the battlefield for maximum effectiveness. The research for 
this thesis will focus on MOEs and MOPs while accounting for SA for human machine 
teaming.   
A. VISION OF UTACC 
The UTACC program has been working with the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory (MCWL) to enhance the capabilities of the USMC through human-machine 
collaboration. The UTACC unmanned system (UxS) is a system of systems (SOS) 
approach to join human and machine capabilities to increase the overall effectiveness and 
efficiency of the force. Each individual component has strengths and weaknesses. UTACC, 
however, is attempting to leverage the strengths of each component in order to increase the 
overall strength and reduce deficiencies within a unit. 
UTACC believes that the machine plays a vital role in future military conflicts. The 
ability to utilize a machine, in place of a human, enhances mission capability. The machine 
can be used when it may be too dangerous or unrealistic to employ a human for a certain 
task. A machine can be used to complete a task, just as a human can. The goal is to get the 
human and machine to work interdependently. The employment of unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) has been around for many years, with positive effects. The principles 
behind UAS can be leveraged to further the development of unmanned ground systems 
(UGS). 
B. NECESSITY OF MOP/MOE 
A Marine makes up a single component within a unit. That Marine develops a 
necessary skill set through training and education in order to become an asset to a particular 
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unit. In order to determine his or her effectiveness, the Marine is evaluated based on 
standards that have been established by the Training and Readiness (T&R) manual. The 
T&R manual is developed through a deliberate process that will be further elaborated on 
in Chapter III. The point is that every Marine is evaluated by the same principles: does he 
or she meet the established standard, or not?  The basis of the evaluation is through the use 
of MOEs and MOPs. 
The requirement to integrate machines within a Marine unit brings about many 
questions. This thesis will try to determine how the machine can be evaluated on 
performance. The machine must be held to a standard that ensures that the team is improved 
by its addition. For this reason, the development of MOEs and MOPs for human-machine 
teams must be developed to establish the standard. As stated by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, “The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance and MOEs to 
determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives and ultimately the end state” 
(U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff [USJCS] J-7, 2011, p. ix). The ability to evaluate the machine 
in the same manner as a human will make it easier for units to train and establish readiness 
for their tasks as described in the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) 2.0. 
C. NECESSITY OF SA 
SA has been established as a critical factor in decision making for military infantry 
operations (Endsley, Holder, Leibrecht, Garland, Wampler & Matthews, 2000). The ability 
to develop SA will continue to be a key to sound decision making in the future for humans 
and machines alike. Technology makes some processes easier, but also creates a problem 
as the requirement for human-machine teaming is established. As the need for collaboration 
between humans and machines on the battlefield evolves, so does the need for team SA 
evaluation.   
Each component, human and machine, possess individual SA. The ability to 
develop individual SA has been a challenge to the USMC for many years. The way to help 
with this process for Marines is to establish tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that 
are standardized throughout the USMC. This process ensures that the key principles of 
observability, predictability, and directability are understood throughout the unit. SA is 
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enhanced when these principles are established. The implementation of machines within 
Marine units should be handled through the same standardization process as humans.   
The combination of individual SA of members of a unit is the basis of the team SA. 
The interactions of the human and machine must be standardized, just as with human only 
teams, to effectively and efficiently build team SA in a human and machine team. A human 
possesses sensors that have necessary abilities and some shortfalls, depending on the task. 
A machine has the same dilemma, pros and cons depending on the task. The ability to join 
the human and machine in a single unit allows the strengths of both to be utilized while 
mitigating the deficiencies. Team SA needs to be established for this to work effectively. 
As such, SA will continue to be a key factor for decision making, regardless of the team 
composition. This is particularly true as we expand analysis beyond the fireteam level to 
that of SA between a fireteam and higher headquarters. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into four additional chapters. Chapter II is a literature 
review that explores human-machine interfaces (HMI) and SA models for human-machine 
collaboration. Chapter III describes the research methodology to incorporate machines into 
USMC units for increased mission capability, with an emphasis on communication and 
decision making through team SA. Chapter IV presents the findings of the research 
described in Chapter III. Chapter V summarizes the results of the thesis research and 
provides recommendations for further research in the field of HMI and robotics in the 
Marine Corps.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This is the tenth Naval Postgraduate School thesis in a succession of related theses 
that support the development of the Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control and 
Collaboration system. The theses that were previously written establish a foundation for 
the UTACC program and their conclusions will be used as a foundation for this effort. 
Additional applicable subject areas include military doctrine and concepts, situational 
awareness, and human-machine integration. Although there is substantial literature 
available for those topics areas, it is not applied to the issue in question: specifically, how 
to integrate a robot member of a fireteam-sized Marine unit with larger echelons of a 
military hierarchy. Another less developed but pertinent subject area includes the co-active 
design methodology and its application in this context. 
A. UTACC CONCEPT  
The Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control and Collaboration system of systems 
has progressed through a series of theses. Rice, Chhabra, and Keim (2015) began the effort 
by developing a concept of operations that saw the UTACC system showing the most initial 
value as a decision support tool and mission planning capability that would reduce the 
cognitive load of its users, especially at the small unit level. Kirkpatrick and Rushing 
(2016) began the effort of defining those most critical measures of performance (MOP) 
and measures of effectiveness (MOE) for the UTACC program. Kulisz and Sharp (2017) 
then followed up this work by focusing on the human-machine communications required 
to successfully integrate a robot into a fireteam-sized Marine unit. Kulisz and Sharp (2017) 
developed and proposed MOEs and MOPs to evaluate those communications and 
concluded by recommending additions to the Marine Corps Task List. Although 
communications were analyzed between humans and robots, this was done in support of a 
small unit and not for those communications between a robot and higher echelons of 
military formations. The USMC is already testing and incorporating robots in tactical 
training scenarios. The groundwork has been underway for many years through the 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program and now with UxS. The intent of UTACC is not 
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to develop a machine to be utilized by the USMC infantry unit, but to determine the 
requirements to make the human-machine team more effective. This thesis will expand 
upon earlier work to focus on the interface and situational awareness requirements for 
successful human-machine integration. 
B. MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE 
When developing a foundational theory for interactions between a robot member 
of a fireteam and higher headquarters organizations, the first principle observed is the use 
of already established military doctrinal concepts as a stepping off point. The capacity for 
supporting the Marine Corps’ adherence to the principles of maneuver warfare and the 
organization’s philosophy of command is foundational to the effort. Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication 1 provides the cognitive framework for characterizing the UTACC 
program as a technological capability to orient on enemy forces (United States Marine 
Corps [USMC], 1997b). A decentralized method of command and control, execution of 
mission tactics and incorporating Commander’s Intent are all relevant concepts to this 
thesis (USMC, 1997b). This is not to say that current doctrine constrains the research; 
simply that it provides a point of departure. 
Command and control is a concept of utmost importance in military operations. 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 explains command and control as an iterative process 
of influences and authority made by a commander and the feedback or control received as 
the effect of command (USMC, 1996). Technology, such as a robot, potentially gives 
another mechanism of control to a commander, especially as a sensor that can provide 
information about the environment or current situation. Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication (MCDP) 6 also provides a definition of The Information Hierarchy as seen in 
Figure 1, and that will be adhered to when defining the types of information being 
exchanged (USMC, 1996). The concept of Image Theory will inform decisions based on 
the portrayal of information sent by a robotic system. Organization theory detailed in 
MCDP 6 will also inform limitations placed on the information and capabilities that an 
external organization should have over a robot in a subordinate fireteam (USMC, 1996). 
Additionally, principles of information management theory must inform decisions 
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regarding whether information is exchanged as a “supply-push” or “demand-pull” manner 
(USMC, 1996). 
 
Figure 1.  The Information Hierarchy. Source: USMC (1996). 
More specifically, Command and Control systems must support the operational 
environment and methods that military units chose to employ to accomplish assigned 
missions. Features of command and control systems must allow for Marine units to conduct 
operations as dispersed, small units in environments that are degraded or denied before 
rapidly aggregating into larger sized units to deal with escalating crises (USMC, 2015). 
Current command and control concepts seek to obtain “widespread information-sharing, 
understanding of the commander’s intent, view of the operational environment, and 
collaborative situation assessments” (USMC, 2015). The Marine Corps’ Command and 
Control Concept (2015) identifies the promise of mobile technologies liberating 
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commanders from command centers and allowing them to conduct essential command and 
control functions from anywhere on the battlefield. Again, command and control doctrine 
and recent concepts are well developed; the UTACC program is wise to adhere to their 
frameworks and align with their principles to be a realistic possibility as a contributor to 
command and control. In the future as the Marine Corps develops the ability to operate 
collaboratively with unmanned systems, such frameworks may require modification. 
Another possibility for the UTACC program centers on the efficacy of utilizing a 
robot member of a fireteam as an intelligence asset for a higher headquarters and thus the 
objectives of intelligence inform the type of information that may be useful. The first 
objective of intelligence is to provide “accurate, timely and relevant knowledge about the 
enemy or surrounding environment” (USMC, 1997a). This type of information and its 
characteristics can help to scope the types of sensors and the information that must be 
conveyed by those sensors when designing the robot. The second objective of intelligence 
is protection of friendly forces through counterintelligence (USMC, 1997a); in this sense, 
the robot must include features (active or passive) that would deny intelligence to enemy 
forces. The desire to increase the number of reporting sensors on the battlefield will need 
to be balanced with the recognition that the future environment will be very much a “battle 
of signatures” (USMC, 2016d). In other words, special attention must be given to reducing 
robot transmission signatures. The Marine Operating Concept details a requirement to 
operate in contested-network environments as a critical task (USMC, 2016d). This critical 
task informs technology requirements to protect communications and limit the signatures 
of those communications. 
C. CO-ACTIVE DESIGN PRINCIPLES  
Co-Active design is an extension of standard systems engineering processes that 
enables a functional analysis of how machines and Marines expect to operate, so as to have 
effective interdependence. The central component of Co-Active Design is to conduct an 
interdependence analysis. That analysis results in an understanding of the observability, 
predictability, and directability (OPD) requirements supporting interdependence. The 
definitions of OPD, based on Matthew Johnson’s (2014) work are cited below: 
 9 
Observability means making pertinent aspects of one’s status, as well as 
one’s knowledge of the team, task, and environment observable to others. 
Since interdependence is about complementary relations, observability also 
involves the ability to observe and interpret pertinent signals. Observability 
plays a role in many teamwork patterns e.g., monitoring progress and 
providing backup behavior. 
Predictability means one’s actions should be predictable enough that others 
can reasonably rely on them when considering their own actions. The 
complementary relationship is considering others’ actions when developing 
one’s own. Predictability is also essential to many teamwork patterns such 
as synchronizing actions and achieving efficiency in team performance.  
Directability means one’s ability to direct the behavior of others and 
complementarily be directed by others. Directability includes explicit 
commands such as task allocation and role assignment as well as subtler 
influences, such as providing guidance or suggestions or even providing 
salient information that is anticipated to alter behavior, such as a warning. 
Teamwork patterns that involve directability include such things as 
requesting assistance and querying for input during decision making. 
(Johnson, 2014, pp. 68–69) 
Co-Active design allows the operator to understand the actions of the machine. This 
model adapted from Johnson (2014) and depicted in Figure 2 attempts to answer core issues 
in robotics providing support for humans. The answer to what the robot is doing, what the 
robot is going to do next, and how to get the robot to what needs to be accomplished is 
answered through OPD and the Coactive Design model. The answer to these questions 
provide confidence to the human and build trust for the human-machine team. It is equally 
as important that the robot is able to “understand” the same answers as well. 
 
Human Needs Issues 
What is the robot doing? Observability 
What is the robot going to do next? Predictability 
How can we get the robot to do what 
we need? 
Directability 
Figure 2.  Core issues in robotics providing support. Adapted from Johnson 
(2014). 
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The Coactive design method, with IA tables, provides UTACC the ability to 
analyze the interdependence of the Marine and machine team. The IA table is a tool 
developed by Matthew Johnson (2014) that assists designers in determining the specific 
requirements for OPD. The IA table supports the analysis of teaming by identifying tasks 
and subtasks of the team, the capabilities required to do the tasks and the “team role 
alternatives” describing different methods for completing the tasks (Johnson, 2014). The 
task required for a specific skill set can be analyzed to determine the most effective way to 
implement machines into a Marine unit to accomplish the mission. It is also a way to show 
how a higher headquarters can have observability, predictability and directability with a 
fireteam or the fireteam’s unmanned systems. 
D. MARINE MACHINE INTEGRATION AND INTERFACE DESIGN 
There has been a traditional understanding of the interactive relationships between 
human and robots that can be described as “on the loop” or “in the loop” whereas the human 
operator has either supervisory control or is in direct and active control of the system (Chen 
& Barnes, 2014). A primary objective of the UTACC program is to limit the cognitive 
saturation that modern military operators are faced with. Thus far, Kulisz and Sharp (2017) 
proposed measures of performance and effectiveness for communications between an 
autonomous robot member of a fireteam and the team’s human members. This work 
centered on humans and a system that would be in relative proximity of each other. In the 
question relevant to this research effort, the circumstances are very much different in that 
the human beings that make up a higher headquarters and the robot member of a fireteam 
would not be in such proximity to each other. Rather, it is most likely that there will be 
considerable distance between the two. This is a fundamental difference in the relationship 
between this group of humans and robots. 
This does not mean, however, that there is not overlap from principles defined and 
developed in the context of an operator relationship between human and robot. For 
example, much of Goodrich (2004) describes preferred methods to interpreting human to 
machine commands and implied tasks. His first suggestion is that situational context 
determines the active human-machine interface. He provides an example where if a human 
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starts operating a joystick, the interface should automatically switch to a mode in which 
the joystick is the active interface, rather than a manual process that needs to be initiated 
(Goodrich, 2004). Another proposed feature is to have the human use an interface to 
interact “with the world” or to “manipulate the relationship between the robot and world” 
rather than having the human use non-intuitive methods for doing so. So for example, if 
one wanted to send a command or information from the human to the robot side of the 
connection, it would be done automatically by translating human desires rather than having 
the human specifically needing to direct specific robot actions (Goodrich, 2004). An 
example of this would be a human selecting a representation of an interesting location on 
a display. The robot would interpret that command and automatically travel to the location 
rather than the operator needing to manipulate a joystick to manually direct the machine. 
An example of manipulating the relationship between robot and world is given by Goodrich 
(2004) where to send a UAV to an altitude, the operator does not increase the pitch until 
the new altitude is reached and then manipulate it to maintain the altitude, rather the display 
allows the operator to input the new required altitude and the robot automatically 
manipulates the required flight characteristics to bring itself to the desired altitude. This is 
all intended to reduce the cognitive load of the operator. These principles can be applied 
and in certain circumstances may be essential in the extended context of this research, and 
are the kinds of analyses that the interdependence analysis addresses. IA also addresses 
what happens if that method fails; that is, IA allows the developer to consider alternate 
means for task completion. This builds task resiliency. 
Additionally, Casper and Murphy (2003) detailed a problem with the limited nature 
of information distribution that is common to robotics. These investigators recognize that 
the information provided by robots must be distributed to multiple echelons in a search and 
rescue operation but is currently technologically limited to information exchange between 
it and its operator (Casper & Murphy, 2003). This necessitates a manual information 
exchange between the operator and external echelons (Casper & Murphy, 2003). Casper 
and Murphy (2003) also recognized that information provided by robots is not simply a 
matter of broadcast but rather there is a requirement to filter and abstract information 
depending on the intended audience (in other words, “not all members…need the same 
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information at the same time”) (p. 381). Casper and Murphy (2003) also report that the 
lack of robot state information caused 54% of working time to be wasted and a lack of 
“state of the world” information had adverse effects on the ability of operators to work 
robots in environments suitable for them. The authors recommend that suitable “assistive 
roles” be identified to compensate for the heavy fatigue encountered in search and rescue 
operations and that “perceptual interfaces” that use auditory or haptic alerts be developed 
to reduce the overuse of the visual sense (Casper & Murphy, 2003). Identifying “assistive” 
roles is another hallmark of the interdependence analysis. 
Murphy (2004) depicts a simple model for demonstrating the transformation of raw 
data into knowledge and the abstraction/filtering that happens as information flows from 
Robot/Operator to a second and third echelon of a search and rescue operation that is 
remotely located. Murphy (2004) notes that information in an urban search and rescue 
scenario “is generally one-way, flowing up from robot data to increasing levels of 
abstraction for the decision-makers in the hierarchy” (p. 148). Murphy (2004) also 
categorizes the raw data produced by robots as “robot’s internal state…relationship to the 
environment… layout of the environment… [and] presence of victims” (p. 148). These are 
all examples of characteristics of the dynamic information that is necessary for exchange 
in the context of a robot member of a fireteam communicating with higher headquarters 
echelons. Furthermore, the ability to have “distributed communication networks offer the 
potential to both relocate a robot team member and immediately propagate information to 
all members of the rescue enterprise” (Murphy, 2004, p. 150). 
The interface utilized for human-machine integration is a key to successful 
operations between humans and machines. The interface needs to be simplistic enough to 
be operated and understood while providing a real-world interpretation of the environment 
by the human operator/supervisor. In an environment in which the team (i.e., the robot and 
a human communicating from a distance) is not located in proximity, the interface becomes 
that much more important to the successful integration of the system. The interface must 
avoid the extremes of being either too simple or too complex: 
A well-designed operator interface presents the operator with enough 
context to quickly carry out a mission and the flexibility to handle 
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unforeseen operating scenarios robustly. By contrast, an unintuitive user 
interface can increase the risk of catastrophic operator error by 
overwhelming the user with unnecessary information. (Marion, Fallon, 
Deits, Valenzuela, D’Arpino, Izatt, Manuelli, Antone, Dai, Koolen, Carter, 
Kuindersma, & Tedrake, 2017) 
There are also several pitfalls that one must be aware of when incorporating 
machines into human teams. Chen and Barnes found that “research on human-automation 
has identified several issues with increased autonomy: tunnel vision, degraded situation 
awareness, misuse and disuse of automated systems, and complacency” (2014, p. 13). In 
some circumstances, the human is found to focus solely on the operations being performed 
by the machine and ignore the surrounding environment, which leads to tunnel vision and 
degraded situation awareness. The human has also been guilty of taking over control for a 
task that machine is more suited to perform without interaction, due to a lack of trust in the 
machine’s ability. Conversely, the human may feel that the machine can do it all and 
disregard their role in the operation which leads to complacency. An interdependence 
analysis is designed to identify these kinds of issues. 
The role of the human in the human-machine team is important to determine the 
level of effectiveness. The task required to be performed by the human will influence the 
number of UxS that may be supervised (De Visser & Parasuraman, 2011). With this focus 
on the nature of the tasks, De Visser and Parasuraman (2011) found that “it is not the 
number of UVs under supervision but the nature of the task carried out by each UV that is 
important in determining the load on the human operator” (p. 228). The interface used may 
be able to reduce the task of the human and lead to the ability to supervise multiple UxS. 
Marion et al. (2017) created a graphical user interface (GUI), Director, to pilot a 
robot during a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Robotics Challenge. The GUI 
consisted of two user interface windows, the main window and the task panel. The task 
panel was the primary interface used by the operator and the robot to complete tasks. 
Marion et al. (2017) describe how “the main window contains a three-dimensional 
visualization environment to draw the robot’s current state, perception sensor data, motion 
plans, and hardware driver status” (p. 8). Furthering their description of its capabilities, 
Marion et al. (2017) describe how “the interface also provides a teleoperation interface to 
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support manual control by the operator” (p. 8). This design allowed for the robot to behave 
autonomously as well as the human to remotely control the robot to complete tasks (Marion 
et al., 2017). The GUI represents a process that could benefit UTACC for utilization of 
machines within a Marine unit and examples of it are depicted in Figures 3 and 4. Although 
the process used was preprogrammed for a specific task, it allowed operators to supervise 
or manually control the robot when deemed necessary. The UTACC problem is more 
extensive and requires the ability to respond to a complex and changing environment. 
Director is a user friendly interface that increases success due to ease of use and may serve 
as an example of what UTACC should strive for. 
 
Figure 3.  Director graphical user interface. Source: Marion et al. (2017). 
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Figure 4.  Task panel interface. Source: Marion et al. (2017). 
E. ROLE OF SITUATION AWARENESS  
A firm understanding for SA must be established, as there are many interpretations 
and definitions. Some researchers have defined SA as the “process of gaining awareness, 
the product of gaining awareness, or a combination of both” (Salmon, Stanton, Walker, 
Baber, Jenkins, McMaster, & Young, 2008). Fracker (1998) defines SA as “the knowledge 
that results when attention is allocated to a zone of interest at a level of abstraction” (pp. 
102–103). The term SA is not the entire cognitive process for making a decision, rather it 
“pertains to the state of a dynamic environment” (Endsley, 1995, p. 36). Endsley’s (1995) 
focus is on SA being a “state of knowledge” rather than a process to achieve a certain level 
of knowledge (p. 36). A number of models have been developed to evaluate and understand 
SA. Most notably Fracker (1988); Endsley (1995); and Smith and Hancock (1995) 
developed models that may be relevant and useful for the UTACC challenge for human-
machine integration. 
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1. Fracker’s Model 
Fracker (1988) focused on the importance of SA required for military pilots to 
perform their duties. He developed the Model of Situation Assessment to explain how the 
long-term memory or “schemata” plays a significant role in SA development. The 
schemata can provide a pilot the ability to fill in the gaps in a given situation, “then the 
pilot need not attend to every detail of the environment to have a reasonably complete 
assessment of the situation” (Fracker, 1988, p. 103). The pilot only needs to develop 
patterns from incoming sensory data to identify schemata. The pilot then searches “the 
schema for items of information not currently in working memory” (Fracker, 1988, p. 104). 
The pilot is forced to increase the work load on “working memory” if the schema is not 
found in the long-term memory. The pilot would have to analyze the environment for 
information, “identify multiple schemata that may be appropriate, place information from 
these several schemata into working memory, and then integrate the information into a 
single result” (Fracker, 1988, p. 104). 
Fracker’s Model of SA relies heavily on the long-term memory of the pilot to 
develop SA. The pilot’s “completeness” of long-term memory would result in less stress 
on the working memory and lead to a higher quality of SA. The “completeness” of long-
term memory is likely to be broader in experienced pilots as compared to that of a “novice” 
pilot. A novice pilot must provide more attention to basic aircraft flight fundamentals and 
has less time for attention to sensory information to build SA. An experienced pilot, 
however, needs less time to focus on flight performance and less time required to build SA. 
Experience, through training and application, and knowledge are instrumental in 
developing SA quickly and accurately. A visual depiction of Fracker’s Model of Situation 




Figure 5.  Fracker’s Model of Situation Assessment. Source: Fracker (1988). 
2. Endsley’s Model  
Endsley’s (1995) Model for SA in dynamic decision making incorporates three 
levels of SA and the interactions involved for decision making; it is depicted in Figure 6. 
This concept is important in order to understand the various factors that contribute to 
decision making. SA is important for making appropriate decisions, but one should not lose 
sight of the fact that it is only a part of the decision-making process and not the sole factor 
as displayed in Figure 6 (Endsley, 1995, p. 35). The model suggest that a person’s 
perception of the environment forms their SA. Endsley (1995) further elaborates on SA as 
consisting of: 
• Level 1 SA: Perception of the Elements in the Environment. 
• Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the Current Situation. 
• Level 3 SA: Projection of Future Status. 
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The ability to understand what SA is and how it affects decision making is 
important for evaluation of the human-machine team. This basic understanding can help 
facilitate the understanding of team SA. The SA of each individual team member 
contributes to the overall team SA. Endsley (1995) thus concludes that “[a]s such, the 
quality of team members’ SA of shared elements (as a state of knowledge) may serve as 
an index of team coordination or human-machine interface effectiveness” (p. 39). This 
depiction of shared elements is depicted in Figure 7. 
 




Figure 7.  Team situation awareness. Source: Endsley (1995). 
3. Smith and Hancock’s Model 
Smith and Hancock (1995) do not view SA in the same manner as Endsley, through 
the interrelationships of perception, comprehension, and projection. Rather, they view SA 
as a means to develop a “purposeful behavior” to accomplish a specific task. SA is 
“adaptive” to dynamic environments through the ability to “direct consciousness” to act in 
an acceptable manner. They used the perception-action cycle from Neisser (1976) as the 
framework for their model. They added the “invariant” as shown in Figure 8 (Smith & 
Hancock, 1995, p. 141) to account for interactions between the elements of the perception-
action cycle. The invariant “codifies the information that the environment may make 
available, the knowledge the agent requires to assess that information, and the action the 




Figure 8.  Perceptual Model of Situation Awareness. Source: Smith and 
Hancock (1995). 
The idea that SA is adaptive gives way to the need to describe what allows it to 
change as the environment changes. Smith and Hancock (1995) explain that SA can only 
be developed if there is a goal to achieve. If an agent does not have a goal, they are merely 
observing the environment and not interacting towards a goal. Therefore, SA is not 
achieved for the agent.  “To qualify for SA, the agent first must intend its goals, beliefs, 
and knowledge to match the task and performance specified by dicta from its environment 
and, then, must succeed to some degree in meeting those expectations” (Smith & Hancock, 
1995, p. 139). The agent must have an idea of what is the “right stuff” or criteria required 
to evaluate performance toward a goal as indicated in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Environment and agent interaction. Source: Smith and Hancock 
(1995), as adapted by Beierl and Tschirley (2017). 
The Department of Defense (DoD) (2018) describes SA through the use of a 
common operation picture (COP) or common tactical picture (CTP). The COP is “a single 
identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates 
collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness” (DoD, 
2018, p. 46). The CTP is “an accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data link 
network, ground network, intelligence network, and sensor networks” (DoD, 2018, p. 46). 
The COP or CTP established at the tactical level is relayed to the higher echelon to further 
develop the situation awareness of all members of the team.   
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4. Team SA 
Team SA plays an important role in the UTACC UxS program. The SA of the team 
must be understood in order to effectively incorporate machines into the team. Beierl and 
Tschirley (2017) determined that the team SA would be impacted by the SA deltas of the 
various team members. The team members may perceive the environment the same but 
comprehend the situation differently and therefore take different actions. UTACC is 
working toward the goal of incorporating a machine into the team and must take into 
account not only the SA of the humans toward the machine, but the machine’s SA with 
respect to the team (Beierl & Tschirley 2017). 
The transformation of individual SA into team SA, when a robot is involved, is 
more complex than human interactions alone. Murphy (2004) describes the nature of 
gaining team SA through a robot’s sensors for interpretation “in order to enable safe and 
complete navigation,” status of the mission and “communicate findings to other members” 
of the team (Murphy, 2004, p. 148) The SA, when incorporating robots, is “primarily about 
spatial relationships between objects and how that impacts robot navigation” (Murphy, 
2004, p. 148) 
Chen and Barnes reviewed human factors literature to determine the factors related 
to human supervision of robots, trust issues related to automation, and situational 
awareness in light of automation. Important considerations when taking the human out of 
the supervisory role include the appearance that situational awareness of an operator (or 
human supervisor) is degraded for tasks that are automated (Chen & Barnes, 2014). There 
is also awareness that interruptions in tasks will have a negative impact on situational 
awareness (Chen & Barnes, 2014). This concept is important when taken from the view of 
higher headquarters agents who by definition will have interrupted engagement with the 
information from individual, subordinate element robots. Additionally, this article 
examines effectiveness in variable attention capabilities, ability to develop and maintain 
spatial awareness and the effect of gaming experience on “visuospatial selective attention, 
multiple object tracking, rapid processing of visual information and imagery, and flexibility 
in attention allocation” (Chen & Barnes, 2014, p. 21). To improve transparency of 
automation, the “3P’s (purpose, process, and performance) as well as the history” of those 
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information elements should be available (Chen & Barnes, 2014, p. 22). It is also 
recommended that the information be simplified so as not to overwhelm a viewer. Among 
the conclusions of the article, the authors suggestion that “human factors design 
augmentation” be implemented to keep human agents situationally aware is directly 
applicable. (Chen & Barnes, 2014, p. 25) 
Goodrich used particular mental models to develop principles in designing human 
robot interfaces. Using literature on attention and working memory, they created a model 
describing how humans process information. The model begins with short-term sensory 
memory capturing information from the environment. This sensory input is identified by 
the acronym SSTM (sensory short-term memory) (Goodrich, 2004). The inputs to this 
SSTM are human senses of hearing, seeing and touch. Goodrich also identifies the limited 
nature of humans to be able to apply attention to these inputs; in other words, not all sensory 
inputs are registered in SSTM. This information is then further processed into short-term 
memory or STM. The information in STM is information that will be used by the human 
for some purpose or to generate a response (Goodrich, 2004). Working memory is the next 
feature of this model which is defined as the information in STM that is also combined 
with some features of long-term memory; those features being “processes encoded as 
mental models” (Goodrich, 2004, p. 3)  A mental model is defined by Goodrich as a 
representation that is internal to a person that is used to “encode, predict and evaluate the 
consequences of perceived and intended changes to the operator’s current state within a 
dynamic environment” (Goodrich, 2004, p. 4). Basically, the author defines a mental model 
as a mechanism from long-term memory that can modify the contents of short term 
memory as it is applicable to a certain situation. Figure 10 shows Goodrich’s 
interrelationships between short-term memory, working-memory, and long-term memory. 
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Figure 10.  Interrelationships between computational elements. Source: 
Goodrich (2004). 
F. CONCLUSION 
This review offers several ways to consider Marine-machine teaming. For this 
research the key findings are five-fold. First, Johnson suggests that Marine machine 
teaming should be based on interdependence, where Marine and machine share common 
goals. Further, that those can be achieved by designing in observability, directability, and 
predictability between Marines and the machine. Interdependence analysis can help 
designers achieve this. Second, achieving OPD is based on understanding situational 
awareness. While many definitions exist, Endsley’s model comes closest to defining a 
meaning applicable to our research question, especially the third level of SA, which has to 
do with projection. This relates well to Johnson’s need for predictability. 
Third, several researchers point out fundamentals of human machine interaction 
that seem obvious but are worth mentioning. That interface design is crucial. There also 
must be a set of tasks defined to develop an interface that builds SA for the team. A properly 
designed interface can be the difference between an effective and ineffective team. 
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Additionally, the interface needs to be user friendly in order to be a force multiplier in the 
battle space. The fourth key finding is that the need to build trust between the Marine and 
machine is vital to the success of teaming. The Marine must trust the machine to perform 
a task in a manner that is as effective as a human would. The machine must trust the human 
to act as the machine expects. OPD provides a baseline for trust to be established between 
human and machine. 
Finally, the method of incorporating machines into a Marine unit needs to be 
adequate and feasible in order to be successful. The USMC utilizes doctrine as the baseline 
to perform all tasks. The use of TTPs which follow from doctrine, allows for Marine-
machine teaming to be interdependent and builds trust within the team. For these reasons, 
the collaboration of Marine and machine must follow doctrine used by the USMC in order 
to be incorporated and increase the likelihood for success. There is substantial literature 
covering robotic autonomy and principles of designing interfaces for the operation of 
robots. Situational awareness is also a topic area that has established relevant theories for 
our research as it applies to military echelons external to a fireteam. There is not, however, 
an application of that research to the question that we are faced with. Namely, how does 
that exterior military echelon interface with an autonomous and interdependent robotic 
member of a fireteam?  That synthesis will be the focus of this thesis.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter outlines the process utilized by this thesis to determine what HMI 
MOEs and MOPs, if any, need to be established to allow for communication to higher 
echelons of command. The requirement to evaluate SA is important to enhance the 
communication flow and relevance of the information. To do this, the authors used a basic 
systems engineering process to evaluate the need for HMI in use for USMC applications. 
The next step was to determine how the Marine Corps establishes doctrine and evaluates 
the incorporation of the doctrine. The final step in MOE and MOP development was to use 
OPD as a basis for evaluation of the HMI to facilitate the decision making of higher 
echelons of command. This method is similar to Kulisz and Sharp (2017) as this thesis is 
expanding on their work for HMI MOEs and MOPs at the fire team level. The final step in 
the overall research process was to use SA models to ensure relevancy of the information 
content and to identify relevant properties of information display. 
A. BASIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The analysis methods of the basic Systems Engineering Process as defined in 
“System Engineering Management 5th edition,” (Blanchard & Blyler, 2016) was used in 
this thesis. The assessment by Kirkpatrick and Rushing (2016), based on the research of 
Rice, Keim, and Chhabra (2015), is accurate when Kirkpatrick and Rushing (2016) 
determined that “UTACC is a system of systems (SoS) capable of independent operations 
while operating within the Marine Corps’ command and control model to ensure unity of 
effort when conducting operations” (Kirkpatrick & Rushing, 2016, p. 15). According to 
Kirkpatrick and Rushing’s (2016) research, “the steps that were most applicable to this 
thesis were: definition of problem, operational requirements, and functional analysis. The 
entire process also incorporated feedback mechanisms as an important element of concept 
generations” (Rice et al., 2015, p. 21). These three steps were found to be of the most value 
for the given problem. Therefore, the focus was on the three steps to determine the 
feasibility of human-machine interaction within the Marine Corps’ command and control 
structure. Figure 11 shows the basic Systems Engineering Model used for this thesis. 
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Figure 11.  Systems Engineering Model. Source: Blanchard and Blyler (2016). 
B. UTACC DEFINITIONS  
The vast number of UTACC program theses makes it important to establish a 
baseline definition for terms. As such, the definitions below are directly sourced from 
Kulisz and Sharp’s (2017) work: 
Small tactical unit—a Marine Corps infantry fire team, infantry squad, or 
reconnaissance team. 
UTACC—armed Marine(s) conducting operations with the assistance of a mix of 
semi-autonomous unmanned ground and air vehicles. One UTACC system is a triad of a 
human component, an air component, and a ground component.  
Human Component—envisioned as a small tactical unit leader. UTACC should 
also be able to work with, provide input to, and receive direction from all members of a 
small tactical unit. 
Air Carrier (AC)—an unmanned ground vehicle capable of carrying, launching, 
recovering, and refueling multiple unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). In addition, the AC will 
be capable of carrying additional supplies (e.g., ammunition, food) for the small tactical 
unit as well as acting as a communications relay for the UTACC components. In the future, 
this vehicle will be capable of high-speed travel over rough terrain and off-road areas. 
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Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV)—an aerial platform capable of carrying any number 
of sensors to support mission specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
requirements and capable of vertical takeoff and landing. The UAV will be capable of 
serving as a vital communications relay node between geographically separated ground 
components. 
Ground Carrier (GC)—an unmanned ground vehicle capable of carrying, 
deploying, and recovering multiple unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). In addition, the 
GC will be capable of carrying additional supplies (e.g., ammunition, food) for the small 
tactical unit as well as acting as a communications relay for the UTACC components. This 
vehicle will be capable of high-speed travel over rough terrain and off-road areas. 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV)—mission specific unmanned systems capable 
of performing discrete ISR missions. The UGVs, similar to the UAVs, could have a variety 
of sensors to support mission specific ISR requirements. 
Cue—is a notification issued by the UIS [defined immediately below] to the Human 
Component where human intervention is not required. 
Alert—is a prompt issued by the UIS to the Human Component requiring human 
intervention. (Rice et al., 2015, pp. 26–27) 
In addition to the preceding terms, it is necessary to update the definition of user-
interface system from Kulisz and Sharp’s (2017) so that the concepts generated by this 
thesis can be accurately portrayed. Using Kulisz and Sharp’s (2017) user interface 
definition as a starting point, we adjust it for this thesis and also define the term 
headquarters element: 
User Interface System (UIS)—a combination of devices that stimulate multiple 
senses in the human. In addition to presenting local information to the human component, 
the UIS will also present information to the headquarters element that may be local, 
geographically separated, or a combination of those circumstances. The devices also 
receive input from the human component and headquarters element. 
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Headquarters Element—a military unit of a higher echelon than the human 
component. This may include an echelon such as a squad, platoon and company etc.  
C. UTACC ASSUMPTIONS 
The lack of current USMC doctrine and research in the field of human-machine 
teaming has resulted in a number of assumptions by UTACC theses. These assumptions 
have been carried over from previous UTACC theses and most recently by Kulisz and 
Sharp (2017). They utilized a technologically agnostic methodology. The authors of this 
thesis used the same approach to further the evaluation of the human-machine interface. 
The most noteworthy assumption made by Kulisz and Sharp (2017), which the 
authors used in this thesis, is that UTACC could evaluate the human-machine team through 
the use of the USMC Task List. This will ensure that the machine is being evaluated on the 
same standard as a Marine and, likely, will increase trust among the team. The machine is 
intended to perform the functions of a human and increase efficiency and effectiveness for 
the USMC. Therefore, the process of evaluation for the incorporation of a robot should be 
similar to that of the human operator. 
Another assumption made by Kulisz and Sharp (2017) that is still viable is that the 
MCTL metrics used would “accurately reflect metrics applied to UTACC in future testing” 
(p. 21). The UTACC program may change over time due to personnel, budget 
considerations, and changes in priorities by sponsors; however, the end goal for UTACC 
is not likely to change in the near future. 
D. UTACC CONSTRAINTS 
The lack of physical resources (machines and Marines) to utilize for testing 
purposes is a significant constraint. The inability to gather a Marine infantry unit and 
machines to determine best practices provided a significant challenge. Therefore, current 
technology and research in the field of HMI was used to make informed decisions as to the 
best way to employ machines to increase effectiveness and capability of Marine units.   
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E. ROLE OF DOCTRINE AND TTPS 
Marine Corps doctrine is at the root of everything that the USMC accomplishes. 
The backbone of the institution is founded on doctrine which is grouped into categories 
such as Marine Corps organization and standards, warfighting and Naval Operations. The 
foundation of USMC doctrine is comprised of the 10 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications 
(MCDPs) which are “higher order doctrine containing fundamental and enduring principles 
regarding warfighting and the guiding doctrine for the conduct of major warfighting 
activities” (USMC, 2006). Following MCDPs are the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publications (MCWP) which “describe how the [Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF)] fights and subject matter that supports and enables MAGTF deployment and 
employment” (USMC, 2016f). Finally, there are Marine Corps tactical publications 
(MCTP) “focused on community-specific or functional tactics that support MAGTF 
operations” (USMC, 2016f) and their subordinate Marine Corps Reference Publications 
(MCRP) containing “general reference and historical material, or more specific/detailed” 
tactics (USMC, 2006). 
The Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) is the next element that can be considered 
Marine Corps doctrine. The MCTL “allows for quantifiable measurement of proficiency 
in military skills and capabilities” (Kirkpatrick & Rushing, 2016, p. 19). The mission of 
the MCTL, as listed on the MCTL branch website, is as follows: 
MCTL is the authoritative, standardized, and doctrinally-based lexicon of 
USMC capabilities defined as Marine Corps Tasks (MCTs) and used by 
units, installations and the supporting establishments in the development of 
Mission Essential Tasks and Task Lists (METs/METLs). METs/METLs are 
the list of “essential,” critical, discrete, externally-focused MCTs that 
directly enables the execution of the organizational mission. Capabilities, 
defined as “MCTs” and resident in MCTL enable Commanders to document 
their command warfighting operational abilities as METs/METLs, 
providing force sourcing planners, trainers and concept developers with 
single common language “tasks” articulating both Joint and USMC-
specific, manpower, equipment and training requirements. (“Marine Task 
List Branch,” n.d.) 
Each Marine Corps Task (MCT) is comprised of pertinent MOPs and MOEs to 
evaluate a particular unit’s ability to accomplish their warfighting functions. Table 1, from 
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Kulisz and Sharp (2017), provides an example of how a MCT is used to evaluate the 
readiness of a unit for a particular task. 
Table 1.   Excerpt from MCTL 2.0. Source: USMC (2018a). 
 
 
There are many MCTs that account for all mission capabilities across the USMC 
and many MOEs and MOPs to evaluate them. As identified by Kulisz and Sharp (2017), 
however, MOEs and MOPs do not exist for human-machine teaming. Kulisz and Sharp 
(2017) identified potential MOEs and MOPs which will be elaborated on later in this 
chapter. 
F. DEVELOPMENT OF MOES AND MOPS 
The development of MOEs and MOPs begins with the overarching guidance from 
the top. Kulisz and Sharp (2017) referred to this as the “developmental layers of analysis.”  
The “layers” provide the basis for MOEs and MOPs as depicted in Figure 12. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) J-7 provided the top-level guidance to the 
authors by virtue of establishing the joint definitions and purposes of MOEs and MOPs. 
The next level to consider is the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation’s (DOT&E) 
approach to determine effectiveness. The mission of DOT&E, as listed on their website, is 
“responsible for issuing DoD OT&E policy and procedures; reviewing and analyzing the 
results of OT&E conducted for each major DoD acquisition program” (“DOT&E Mission,” 
2018). They provide a detailed approach to determine the effectiveness of a particular 
system. The final consideration is the proposed UTACC MOEs and MOPs that were 
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introduced by Kulisz and Sharp (2017) and further revised by MCTs of interest to the 
UTACC program and the OPD Interdependence Analysis (IA) Tables from Zach’s 
Coactive Design thesis (Zach, 2016). 
 
Figure 12.  Framework for HMI MOE and MOP development. Source: Kulisz 
and Sharp (2017, p. 24). 
1. CJCS J-7 Commander’s Handbook for Assessment  
 The CJCS J-7’s Commander’s Handbook for Assessment Planning and 
Execution establishes a baseline for developing MOEs and MOPs for the UTACC systems. 
The MOEs and MOPs establish a metric to assess how the system is performing and if it is 
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accomplishing the goals of a mission. Notably, this handbook is not an approved directive, 
but rather a supplemental document for the assessment process.   
The CJCS J-7 Commander’s Handbook states that “the assessment process uses 
MOPs to evaluate task performance and MOEs to determine progress of operations toward 
achieving objective, and ultimately the end state” (USJCS J-7, 2011, p. III-4). Figure 13 
(USJCS J-7, 2011, p. III-5) shows how the MOPs and MOEs are utilized for assessment. 
The authors believe this to be an effective method to determine if new MOPs or MOEs are 
required or changes need to be made as the HMI is elevated to higher echelons of 
command. 
 
Figure 13.  Assessment measures and indicators for MOPs and MOEs. Source: 
USJCS J-7 (2011, p. III-5). 
2. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 
As identified by Kulisz and Sharp (2017) “DOT&E is the primary agency 
responsible for the operational testing and evaluation of major DoD acquisitions programs” 
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(Kulisz & Sharp, 2017, p. 25). UTACC is in the early phase of research towards 
development of unmanned systems. It is important to follow the guidelines of established 
policy, as with DOT&E, to minimize the impact of problems that may arise later in the 
process.   
Kulisz and Sharp (2017) identified the need to use the generic “Vee” approach, 
depicted in Figure 14, to ensure that the user and developer are both involved throughout 
the Systems Engineering Process. This is an effective and efficient way to ensure that the 
developer and customer can identify issues early in the design process to avoid setbacks 
and control costs. This will also allow the customer to be part of the design process. 
 
Figure 14.  Generic “Vee” Developmental Model. Source: Blanchard and Blyler 
(2016). 
As stated by Kulisz and Sharp (2017), metrics are invaluable to determine the 
success of testing. After a review and evaluation, the authors applied the same framework 
for developing metrics as used by Kulisz and Sharp (2017) which originated from DOT&E. 
Continuous or discreet metrics are generated based on the type of assessment mechanism 
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that is intended. Continuous metrics rely on quantitative feedback into their outputs (Kulisz 
& Sharp, 2017). An example of the output is shown in Table 2. As Kulisz and Sharp (2017) 
state, the metric that causes the MOP to be continuous is the variable of 100 meters rather 
than the “meets threshold” evaluation of “Y.” 
Table 2.   Continuous metric example. Source: Kulisz and Sharp 
(2017, p. 27). 
Task Variable Meets Threshold 
Relay information to Platoon Commander 100 meters Y 
 
Discrete metrics are measured by a pass/fail metrics. An example of discrete 
metrics is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Discrete metric example. Source: Kulisz and Sharp 
(2017, p. 27). 
Task Meets Threshold 
Relay information to Platoon Commander Y 
 
Continuous metrics provide a basis for measuring the effectiveness of a task. 
Discrete metrics, however, disregard the context and is limited in its ability to provide 
relevant information (Kulisz & Sharp, 2017). The discrete example does not provide 
pertinent information, such as, how far away the machine is from the Platoon Commander. 
The authors decided to follow the methods used by Kulisz and Sharp (2017), using discrete 
metrics for MOEs and continuous metrics for MOPs. Table 4 provides a visual directly 





Table 4.   Discrete/continuous metric application to MOEs and MOPs. 
Source: Kulisz and Sharp (2017, p. 27). 
MOE Task Threshold 
1.0 Sensor is resilient to operating environment Y 
MOP Task Variable Threshold 
1.0.1 Sensor is waterproof 50 m Y 
1.0.2 Sensor is windproof 40 kts Y 
1.0.3 Sensor is temperature-
proof 
-30o to 180o F Y 
 
3. UTACC MOEs and MOPs 
As stated, UTACC does not have approved MOEs and MOPs for human-machine 
teaming. Kulisz and Sharp (2017) developed a proposal for MOEs and MOPs by way of a 
recommended addition to the MCTL 2.0, depicted in Table 5.   
Table 5.   Recommended update to the MCTL 2.0. Source: Kulisz and 
Sharp (2017, p. 33).  
 
 
The recommended addition was MCT 5.1.4, due to the unique nature of 
communication between human and machine. They further elaborated on MCT 5.1.4 as 
shown in Table 6. 
MCT Title
5 Exercise Command and Control
5.1 Acquire, Process, Communicate Information, and Maintain Status
5.1.1 Provide and Maintain Communications
5.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information
5.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status
5.1.4 Maintain Two-Way Communication with Autonomous Robotics
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Table 6.   Recommended update to MCT 5.1.4. Source: Kulisz and 
Sharp (2017, p. 33). 
 
 
The work done by Kulisz and Sharp (2017) directly relates to the subject of this 
research. As such, we have used the proposed changes to the MCTL 2.0 for further 
evaluation of applicability to communication beyond the scope of a Fire Team. 
The ability to successfully create a human-machine team is dependent on creating 
observability, predictability, and directability (OPD). The human and machine need to have 
OPD to increase effectiveness, reduce cognitive load, increase SA, and achieve better 
decision making. 
Table 7 demonstrates the framework employed by Kulisz and Sharp (2017) to use 
Coactive Design IA Tables to establish required technical parameters for evaluation. The 
tasks are in the left column. The tasks are then broken down by specific OPD requirements 
to determine the most effective method for mission accomplishment. The colors represent 
the extent of assistance either entity (man or machine) can provide to the other in the 
performance of the task. The end result is a focused MOP. This method facilitates effective 
development of MOEs and MOPs.   
MCT Title
5.1.4 Maintain Two-Way Communication with Autonomous Robotics
5.1.4.1 Identification of Team Members
5.1.4.2 Explicit Human-Initiated Communication
5.1.4.3 Explicit Robot-Initiated Communication
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G. ROLE OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS A METRIC  
Situation Awareness is not easily measured with human subjects. As identified by 
Beierl and Tschirley (2017), however, “machine programming provides an opportunity to 
record and evaluate objective SA data. Specific SA assessments should seek to map the 
interactions between agent perception and the particular schema used to build 
comprehension and projection in order to improve programming” (Beierl & Tschirley, 
2017, p. 64).   The ability to measure SA of the UxS allows the human agent to better 
employ the machine for effective and efficient results.   
The ability to measure SA of a machine can be accomplished with proper coding 
for a given situation. The machine can be programmed to perform a task while taking the 
environmental variables into account. The actions of the machine can then be evaluated in 
the same manner as is done for a human. The ability to code a machine for a specific task 
is similar to the training and education of a human. Additionally, though, the code for a 
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machine can be verified and logs can be reviewed to provide an objective evaluation of 
performance. This is similar to the process of evaluating humans through a standardized 
metric. The authors believe that for this reason, the machine can be evaluated using similar 
types of MOEs and MOPs to which Marines are held accountable. 
Beierl and Tschirley (2017) did extensive research on SA for human-machine 
teaming as it applied to a particular task. Their focus was on the USMC doctrinal Training 
and Readiness (T&R) event “INF-MAN-3001: Conduct fire and movement.”  They used a 
combination of Hancock and Smith’s SA Model and Endsley’s SA Model to develop a 
suitable model for UTACC HMI. Beierl and Tschirley’s Model adapted from Endsley’s is 
shown in Figure 15. 
Beierl and Tschirley (2017) replaced Endsley’s “goals and objectives” with mission 
as the driving factor for SA. They proposed that “the mission should be the central starting 
point of the model because SA cannot exist without an externally oriented task, goal, or 
objective” (Beierl & Tschirley, 2017, p. 44). 
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Dashed boxes are subsumed into mission and schemata boxes 
Figure 15.  Proposed Model of Individual SA. Source: Beierl and Tschirley 
(2017, p. 45). 
The need for individual SA is apparent. The need for team SA, however, is of more 
importance to the UTACC program. The interdependence of humans and robots relies on 
team SA and trust. Beierl and Tschirley (2017) noted this and adapted a team SA model 
from Sulistyawati, Chui, and Wickens (2009) with emphasis on specific and shared SA as 
shown in Figure 16. Beierl and Tschirley (2017) define specific SA in reference to an 
individual member of the team. Team SA is composed of the specific and shared SA (Beierl 
& Tschirley, 2017). The specific SA is shown within the ellipse while shared SA is shaded.   
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Ellipses were used as opposed to circles in order to display all possible iterations of shared 
SA. Circles suffice for depicting shared SA regions between three members, but not for 
teams of four members 
Figure 16.  Model of Team SA from a team member’s perspective. Source: 
Beierl and Tschirley (2017, p. 47). 
Beierl and Tschirley (2017) determined that the SA model would be different for 
the team leader due to the requirement that they be held accountable for the entire group. 
The team leader SA perspective is shown in Figure 17. The leader is concerned with not 
only their own SA or the specific SA of a team member, but also the overall team SA. This 
principle applies to all levels of command. The leader of a team, regardless of the size of 
the team, must account for individual SA and team SA. The Fire Team Leader in 
Figure 17 can be exchanged for a Platoon Sergeant, Platoon Commander, or anyone else 
in a leadership role. The ability of the team leader to quickly assess the team SA allows for 
quicker and more appropriate decision making.   
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Figure 17.  Model of Team SA from the Fire Team Leader’s perspective. Source: 
Beierl and Tschirley (2017, p. 49). 
As stated previously, the need for interdependence for the human-machine team 
relies on SA and trust. An effective method to increase SA and trust is through the use of 
OPD. The ability of the human and machine to observe, predict, and direct the actions of 
each other will lead to trust in what each member is doing. The human or machine will 
gain SA and trust through the process of OPD. Beierl and Tschirley (2017) noted this 
through the use of Endsley’s three levels of SA to intrateam mechanisms shown in Figure 
18. Beierl and Tschirley determined “application of OPD principles to team interface 
design will generate the intrateam visibility that is necessary in the infantry fire team” 
(Beierl and Tschirley, 2017, p. 50). This principle can be scaled accordingly and applied 
to higher echelons of military commands. 
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Figure 18.  Levels of SA applied to OPD. Source: Beierl and Tschirley (2017, p. 
50). 
Beierl and Tschirley (2017) used the principles from the SA model to develop IA 
Tables for the first subtask, “suppress the enemy,” of their selected T&R event, “conduct 
fire and movement” (USMC, 2016b, p. 7–56). They evaluated the task in regards to 
standard USMC TTPs for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and fire support, 
time available, space, and logistics (METT-TSL). Table 8, shows the assessment for 
mission SA for the subtask “suppress the enemy.”  The fire team leader has to be able to 
communicate with the machine and the machine must be able to provide acknowledgement 
back to the team leader. The need for proper communication flow plays a significant role 
in team SA, OPD, and trust.   
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Table 8.   IA table: Mission SA requirements. Source: Beierl and 





The ability to incorporate SA into a metric that can be objectively evaluated is a 
tough task for the UTACC program as it applies to HMI. The need to evaluate SA is 
relevant to the use of machines as part of USMC teams and the ability to exchange 
information between various levels of command. The ability to evaluate SA will lead to 
enhanced team SA and better informed decisions. The end result is a more effective and 
efficient Marine Corps unit. The authors feel that the most logical method is to apply 
UTACC SA models to a subset of relevant MCTL 2.0 items. This will allow for the 
objective evaluation process that the USMC currently uses for assigned tasks.  
H. INFORMATION DISPLAY 
The final level of analysis required when formulating interface design requirements 
is the manner of information display. As the analysis progresses further up the level of 
military hierarchy, the importance of display increases as the proximity of UTACC actors 
become farther separated. Individual members of a fireteam will be relatively close to one 
another while individual members of a company could be spread over large distances. The 
authors use Wickens, Lee, Liu and Becker’s (2004) categories of display design based on 
perception, mental model, attention, and memory to identify key characteristics depending 
on the information presented. A survey of the thirteen principles described by Wickens et 
al. (2004) is listed in Table 9. All thirteen principles do not apply to every element of 
information, but they were used to screen those elements to recommend how they should 
be presented. 
Table 9.   Categories of display design. Source: Wickens et al. (2004). 
Perception Mental Model Attention Memory 





judgement limits Moving Part 
Proximity 
Compatibility Predictive Aiding 
Top-down 
processing  Multiple resources Consistency 
Redundancy Gain    
Discriminability    
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I. CHAPTER CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
The need for a HMI that can be held accountable to the standards set forth by the 
USMC is required in order to build a successful human-machine team. The most logical 
way to do that is by expanding the current standards to account for the actions required by 
a machine. The machine needs to be objectively evaluated on its ability to perform the 
required tasks as a member of a team. The use of OPD, MOEs and MOPs make a human-
machine team on the battlefield a realistic goal for the USMC. 
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IV. UTACC INTERFACE DESIGN 
The interface design is critical to ensure that a human-machine team can collaborate 
towards common goals. Chapter III discussed the methods used to evaluate the methods 
for HMI requirements. Chapter IV leverages the USMC method for evaluation, MCTL 2.0, 
to determine interface design specifications. The implementation of interface design 
requirements will increase the likelihood of positive human-machine teaming. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A preliminary screening of MCTL 2.0 developed the basis for the expansion of 
UTACC HMI MOEs and MOPs with an emphasis on SA. The need to create standards for 
the HMI is crucial to the successful incorporation and collaboration in any USMC unit. As 
with human members of a military team, an ability to evaluate the way robots perform in 
the context of a group is essential. Unfortunately, the method by which the evaluation takes 
place for machines is much harder to determine. The USMC uses MCTL 2.0 as the current 
basis to evaluate force readiness. As such, the implementation of machines should be 
evaluated in the same manner to avoid confusion and maintain the standards that have 
already been established. Kulisz and Sharp (2017) evaluated Marine Corps Tactical Task 
(MCT) 5 to determine some baseline needs for HMI evaluation. This thesis takes a broader 
approach by evaluating MCTL 2.0 and determining where the machine may be useful and 
needs evaluation.  
The requirement to account for SA while integrating machines is a critical 
component to ensure collaboration is effective. The ability to evaluate SA in this context 
can be incorporated in the applicable tasks that make up MCTL 2.0. For this reason, 
UTACC related MCTs within the MCTL 2.0 need to be crafted so that they allow for 
objective evaluation. This ensures that SA is enhanced by the use of the HMI. SA 
degradation defeats an important factor in the use of the machines: their use as a force 
multiplier. The need for an interoperable machine is apparent, as the machine can perform 
tasks that a human may not be able to perform or have risks that are too high to make the 
task feasible by a human. The loss of SA, however, may impact the task to a level where 
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the machine is not a viable option. This is a crucial factor for incorporating UTACC-
enabled SA within MCTL 2.0 and a robot into a human team. 
B. PRINCIPLES OF THE INTERFACE 
At a UTACC-enabled small unit, there will be one or more robots that will have a 
user interface system (UIS). The possibilities for the UIS at a small tactical unit are well 
defined by Kulisz and Sharp (2017) as they survey the sensory modes possible for 
implementation: visual, audio, haptic and electromagnetic. We do not repeat their analysis. 
We look only at those characteristics required to team across military echelons:  namely, 
information exchanged between a higher headquarters element and the smaller tactical unit. 
There will be principles of interface design that will hold true no matter the type of 
information being exchanged. The determining factor in establishing these principles is the 
form factor and capabilities of the devices chosen to relay the information that is being 
exchanged. The characteristics of the information being exchanged will also inform the 
interface design, but that will be tied specifically to the type of information. There are also 
two “ends” of the communication link that must be analyzed to determine the appropriate 
principles: the higher headquarters and the small tactical unit. Another way to describe this 
is by asking two questions. First, what information is required to maintain situational 
awareness?  Secondly what are the other, common characteristics required by the 
interfaces? 
1. Situational Awareness 
There are certain elements of information that must be exchanged to establish or 
maintain situational awareness in a military environment. Beierl and Tschirley (2017) 
identified the ability to tie Endsley’s levels of situational awareness to OPD principles to 
generate necessary visibility between teams. Figure 19 depicts the situation, status and 
teamwork mechanisms intersecting between a company commander and platoon 
commanders. This is simply applying the Model Beierl and Tschirley (2017) adapted for 
the fireteam level to a higher military echelon. This usage along with applying Endsley’s 
level of situational awareness to OPD principles provides us with specific information 
elements required to be exchanged.  
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Figure 19.  Model of Team SA from Company Commander’s perspective. 
Adapted from Beierl and Tschirley (2017). 
There are three essential elements of information that are required to be exchanged 
for the purposes of establishing or maintaining situational awareness. They are information 
regarding mission and Commander’s Intent; the operational environment; and information 
regarding enemy and friendly forces. This information is derived from the application of 
UTACC situational awareness models and the planned incorporation of the systems into a 
military hierarchy. 
a. Mission and Intent 
The first essential element that contributes to situational awareness is information 
regarding the mission. The mission is articulated in a mission statement that includes the 
information elements who, what, where and when (USMC, 2016e). The UxS must have 
the ability to receive this information from the headquarters (Beierl and Tschirley, 2017) 
and also must have the ability to acknowledge its receipt. A higher headquarters must also 
be capable of receiving the mission of the smaller unit and interact with them about the 
content. The information should be able to be presented in text format and by a visual 
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graphic depicting standard military topographical map information and operational terms 
and graphics. 
Equally important is the inclusion of Commander’s Intent which includes the 
information elements of “purpose of the operation and the desired military end state” (DoD, 
2018, p. 44). This information should be inputted and presented to the UIS in text format, 
to allow for commanders to articulate the intent flexibly and suitable to the situation. An 
example of how the information might be portrayed is presented in Figure 20. This 
information must be presented to the UxS in a format understandable to the machine. 
Although an UxS may not be capable of understanding the meaning of the content, it must 
at least recognize if there is an update and alert its human counterpart. The intent therefore 
must also be capable of being “translated” to a human-readable format for viewing by other 
members of the small tactical unit team. Note that both affect predictability and 
observability, and are closely related to directability within the OPD construct.   
 
Figure 20.  Example update of Commander’s Intent 
b. Forces and Environment 
The second category of essential information that contributes to situational 
awareness in this context is information about forces (either friendly or enemy) and the 
environment. The UIS must thus be able to transmit and receive relevant combat and 
intelligence data. The UIS must have the capability to identify and present location 
information of military targets. The ability to transmit and receive imagery related to 
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targets is also a requirement. The interface should be able to show or receive enemy 
disposition, strength and activity (either recent or ongoing) (USMC, 2018a). The same 
information regarding friendly forces should be included as a capability of the interface. 
This information could be presented as textual information or utilizing standard military 
iconography and geographic data. 
In addition to information about forces, there must be the capability to exchange 
information about the environment. The well-known doctrinal acronym OCOKA-W 
describes those elements of the environment: “observation and fields of fire, cover and 
concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach and weather” (USMC, 2016a, p. 
I-28). The interface must be able to present and alert to the presence or update of any of 
these specific elements of information. We hypothesize that this acronym may need to be 
altered when used in the context of UxS, due to the inherent capabilities and limitations of 
robotic systems. An example of this is related to the different ways in which humans and 
robots perceive long grasses. Long grass is easily recognized by Marines, while an UxS 
might “see” it as an obstacle.   
2. Common Principles 
The first general principle is that the information sent to and from a unit must 
increase understanding of Commander’s Intent and the operational environment (USMC, 
2015). This principle is primarily focused on the reduction of unnecessary information. 
Therefore, the UIS must automatically abstract and filter information to an appropriate 
level. For example, if a fireteam is located outside of the vicinity of a significant event so 
much so that they are unable to influence it, they should not automatically receive that 
information. This is not to say that the information should be restricted, just that it should 
not be presented as a cue or alert. This would limit the cognitive processing required by 
the small tactical unit. An example of this abstraction process is depicted in Table 10. Here, 
the detail of information is filtered as it transitions up or down the unit hierarchy. 
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Table 10.   Example information abstraction across echelons 
 
 
In this example, the automatic identification of individual fireteam members 
remains at the fireteam level. The human element at the fireteam is the only one who needs 
this information to be automatically presented. At the squad level, the squad leader cares 
about the location of whole fireteams and other squads. This abstraction and filtering 
continues in this manner as you progress to higher echelons in the military hierarchy. We 
also note that this abstraction process might be done by an intelligent software component. 
In this case, the software should be treated with the same OPD approach and analysis to 
ensure it is appropriately designed to support the mission. 
The second general principle is that the alerting or presentation of important 
information must be done in a redundant manner and be discriminable between the 
different types of information (i.e., it must incorporate resilient features). This also includes 
the practice of utilizing multiple communication paths if possible. The redundancy 
requirement presents important information in more than one way to reduce the possibility 
that it will be missed or misinterpreted (Wickens et al., 2004). A popular example for 
depicting this concept is a traffic stoplight where both the color of the light and its position 
indicate the information rather than just one or the other as depicted in Figure 21. For 
example, if the UTACC unit receives updated Commander’s Intent, the alert or cue could 
come in the form of a haptic response and an audible tone in the earpiece of the fireteam 
leader. This is essential for both transmission of information and acknowledgement of the 
receipt of interactions.   
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Figure 21.  Example of Information Redundancy 
Furthermore, the alert or cue for that specific information should be different or 
distinguishable from other pieces of information, if it is important that the information be 
distinguished (Wickens et al., 2004). This prevents confusion due to similarity of the alerts 
or cues. This distinguishability could be enforced depending on message content or 
priority. For example, a critical priority alert might generate repeated vibrations on a 
fireteam leader’s communication interface whereas one of less priority might only generate 
a single vibration. In an environment where sound discipline is not a factor, different 
frequencies of audible tones could be generated. 
The final common principle is that the UIS must also be able to prepare, exchange 
and present standard intelligence products. Required and standardized formats should be 
automatically generated from data entered by the human component or headquarters 
element. Examples of reports include reconnaissance exploitation reports, casualty report, 
contact report and enemy sighting report et cetera. Depending on the sensors operating on 
the UTACC, additional intelligence information and reports might be generated such as 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) products and imagery intelligence. The automatic generation 
of standardized reports will reduce the cognitive load of both the preparer and recipient of 
the intelligence. 
C. MCTL 2.0 EVALUATION 
The collaboration between Marine and machine provides unique capabilities and 
challenges. The machine has the potential to be a force multiplier and provide the 
commander with more tools to accomplish the mission. The requirement exists to place 
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machines into units to increase the chance for mission success. Poor collaboration and 
utilization of machines, however, can be a detriment to unit cohesion and success. Utilizing 
the standards that already exist, MCTL 2.0 is the most efficient way for the USMC to 
incorporate the change into man-machine teaming.   
The MCTL 2.0 is a tool that allows for a standardized method of evaluating and 
describing requirements for training and operations. MCTL 2.0 does not currently account 
for an autonomous machine’s ability to enhance readiness as envisioned by the UTACC 
program. In order to describe the contributions of the machine, MCTL 2.0 has been 
reviewed with emphasis on individual ability, teaming ability, and SA. The 
recommendations for additions, or adjustments based on the design principles above, are 
listed in the following tables. 
1. Recommended MCT Updates 
Table 11 depicts an excerpt from MCTL 2.0 and the MOPs associated with MCT 
2.1.1.3- Provide Indications and Warnings.   
Table 11.   Excerpt from MCTL 2.0. Source: USMC (2018a). 
M1 Days Prior to operation for useful information. 
M2 Y/N Intelligence requirements identified and prioritized to 
address I&W.  
M3 Y/N Named Area of Interest identified. 
M4 Percent Of indicators necessary to reassess enemy COA 
identified. 
M5 Time To disseminate I&W. 
M6 Y/N I&W information passed in accordance with SOPs and 
direction. 
M7 Percent Of critical and system up-time availability. 
M8 Y/N Organic teams have the capability to collect, process, and 
disseminate information meeting I&W criteria. 
M9 Y/N Enemy fails to achieve tactical surprise. 
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Table 12 depicts the recommended update to MCT 2.1.1.3 with the addition of M10 
and M11 in order to account for the ability to measure the machine’s ability to provide 
indications and warnings. 
Table 12.   Recommended update to MCT 2.1.1.3. Adapted from USMC 
(2018a). 
M1 Days Prior to operation for useful information. 
M2 Y/N 
Intelligence requirements identified and prioritized to 
address I&W. 
M3 Y/N Named Area of Interest identified. 
M4 Percent Of indicators necessary to reassess enemy COA identified. 
M5 Time To disseminate I&W. 
M6 Y/N 
I&W information passed in accordance with SOPs and 
direction. 
M7 Percent Of critical and system up-time availability. 
M8 Y/N 
Organic teams have the capability to collect, process, and 
disseminate information meeting I&W criteria. 
M9 Y/N Enemy fails to achieve tactical surprise. 
M10 Y/N UxS passes environmental hazard information. 
M11 Y/N UxS transmits enemy information. 
 
Another MCT that required updating based on our analysis was MCT 2.1.1.5 
Support Targeting. This task details what is required for intelligence to support the 
targeting process by “identifying target systems, critical nodes, and high-value and high-
payoff targets, as well as, by providing the intelligence required to most effectively engage 
these targets” (USMC, 2018a, p. 129). Table 13 depicts an excerpt from MCTL 2.0 that 




Table 13.   Current MCT 2.1.1.5 Support Targeting Measures. Source: 
USMC (2018a). 
M1 Y/N Targets assigned relative value. 
M2 Percent Of prioritized targets collected upon. 
M3 Percent Of failed attacks on high priority targets (HPTs) attributed to 
incorrect enemy location data. 
M4 Y/N Maintain display of current enemy situation with target 
locations and priorities. 
M5 Y/N Maintain country files, technical databases, and deployment 
tech kits for geographic locations and functional areas. 
M6 Number/Day Targets administratively processed during a given phase or 
time requirement. 
M7 Y/N Perform I&W, processing, analysis exploitation, production, 
and reporting on SIGINT information. 
M8 Percent Of targets susceptible to non-lethal kill allocated to non-
lethal attack systems. 
M9 Y/N  Blue-on-Blue engagements conducted. 
M10 Hours After receipt of Orders to review FSC Measures Guidance. 
M11 Hours Before ATO-cycle begins, JTCB Guidance is passed to 
targeting agencies (e.g., JFACC). 
M12 Percent Of selected high priority targets (HPTs) have coordinates 
available. 
M13 Hours For the targeting cycle to be completed. 
M14 Time Blue Print procedures initiated by ADC for unknown or 
suspect tracks in the CIEA. 
M15 Percent Of desired results achieved by expected conclusion of a given 
phase or time line. 
M16 Percent Minimum of intercepts CID prior to engagement. 
M17 Y/N HPT/HVT identified. 
M18 Y/N Target folders with Precision Geolocation (PGL) developed 
as required. 
M19 Y/N ID Electronic Warfare threats.  
M20 Y/N ID Cyberspace threats. 
M21 Y/N Threat to aircraft identified. 
M22 Y/N BHA collected via ISR or MISREP. 
M23 Y/N Re-Strike recommendations made. 
M24 Y/N Theater Net-Centric Geolocation (TNG) / Hostile Integrated 
Targeting System (HITS) provided as required. 
M25 Y/N Direction Finding (DF) capability provided. 
M26 Y/N Conduct organic logistics in order to enable Communications 
Intelligence Support. 
 59 
M27 Y/N Establishment of tactical communications; man packable, 
team portable, palletized, and mobile high bandwidth 
communications and information systems connectivity, up to 
the TS//SCI level, with organic assets, other services, joint, 
theater, and multi-national intelligence organizations and 
assets. 
M28 Y/N Automatically disseminate releasable information across 
multiple security level domains. 
M29 Y/N Capable of acquiring hand held still images ISO targeting 
requirements (e.g., COMCAM, Intel, etc.). 
M30 Y/N Capable of acquiring hand held video ISO targeting 
requirements (e.g., COMCAM, Intel, etc.). 
 
Table 14 depicts an update to the MCTs with M18, M21 and M24 added to 
incorporate the UTACC system. 
Table 14.   Recommended update to MCT 2.1.1.5. Adapted from USMC 
(2018a). 
M1 Y/N Targets assigned relative value. 
M2 Percent Of prioritized targets collected upon. 
M3 Percent Of failed attacks on high priority targets (HPTs) attributed 
to incorrect enemy location data. 
M4 Y/N Maintain display of current enemy situation with target 
locations and priorities. 
M5 Y/N Maintain country files, technical databases, and 
deployment tech kits for geographic locations and 
functional areas. 
M6 Number/Day Targets administratively processed during a given phase or 
time requirement. 
M7 Y/N Perform I&W, processing, analysis exploitation, 
production, and reporting on SIGINT information. 
M8 Percent Of targets susceptible to non-lethal kill allocated to non-
lethal attack systems. 
M9 Y/N  Blue-on-Blue engagements conducted. 
M10 Hours After receipt of Orders to review FSC Measures Guidance. 
M11 Hours Before ATO-cycle begins, JTCB Guidance is passed to 
targeting agencies (e.g., JFACC). 
M12 Percent Of selected high priority targets (HPTs) have coordinates 
available. 
M13 Hours For the targeting cycle to be completed. 
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M14 Time Blue Print procedures initiated by ADC for unknown or 
suspect tracks in the CIEA. 
M15 Percent Of desired results achieved by expected conclusion of a 
given phase or time line. 
M16 Percent Minimum of intercepts CID prior to engagement. 
M17 Y/N HPT/HVT identified. 
M18 Y/N HPT/HVT identified, labeled and transmitted by 
autonomous robot 
M19 Y/N Target folders with Precision Geolocation (PGL) developed 
as required. 
M20 Y/N ID Electronic Warfare threats. 
M21 Y/N Electronic Warfare threats identified, labeled and 
transmitted by autonomous robot 
M22 Y/N ID Cyberspace threats. 
M23 Y/N Threat to aircraft identified. 
M24 Y/N Threat to aircraft identified, labeled and transmitted by 
autonomous robot 
M25 Y/N BHA collected via ISR or MISREP. 
M26 Y/N Re-Strike recommendations made. 
M27 Y/N Theater Net-Centric Geolocation (TNG) / Hostile 
Integrated Targeting System (HITS) provided as required. 
M28 Y/N Direction Finding (DF) capability provided. 
M29 Y/N Conduct organic logistics in order to enable 
Communications Intelligence Support. 
M30 Y/N Establishment of tactical communications; man packable, 
team portable, palletized, and mobile high bandwidth 
communications and information systems connectivity, up 
to the TS//SCI level, with organic assets, other services, 
joint, theater, and multi-national intelligence organizations 
and assets. 
M31 Y/N Automatically disseminate releasable information across 
multiple security level domains. 
M32 Y/N Capable of acquiring hand held still images ISO targeting 
requirements (e.g., COMCAM, Intel, etc.). 
M33 Y/N Capable of acquiring hand held video ISO targeting 






Table 15 depicts an excerpt from Kulisz and Sharp (2017) for a recommended 
change to MCT 5.1.4.1.3 Electromagnetic Identification of Team Members.   
Table 15.   MCT 5.1.4.1.3 Electromagnetic Identification of Team 




Table 16 depicts the recommended update to MCT 5.1.4.1.3 with the addition of 
M4 and M5 in order to account for the ability to identify team members beyond-line-of-
site and the time required to relay that information. 
Table 16.   Recommended update to MCT 5.1.4.1.3. Adapted from 
Kulisz and Sharp (2017). 
M1 Percent Of fire team members UTACC can identify 
electromagnetically 
M2 Percent Of time UTACC can electromagnetically identify the 
primary human (fire team leader) 
M3 Time To electromagnetically identify the primary human (fire 
team leader) 
M4 Y/N Able to identify higher, adjacent or subordinate teams 
using beyond-line-of-site (BLOS) means. 
M5 Time To identify higher, adjacent or subordinate teams 
using beyond-line-of-site (BLOS) means. 
 
2. Recommended MCT Addition 
In addition to the recommended updates to the MCTL 2.0, an additional task is 
necessary to fully allow for evaluation of a UTACC system. The addition of a task labeled 
2.2.6 Conduct Autonomous System Intelligence Collection Activities is logically placed 
under 2.2 Collect Data and Intelligence in the hierarchy. Table 17 depicts the newly 
proposed hierarchy. 
5.1.4.1.3 Metric Electromagnetic Identification of Team Members
M1 Percent Of fire team members UTACC can identify electromagnetically
M2 Percent Of time UTACC can electromagnetically identify the primary human (fire team leader)
M3 Time To electromagnetically identify the primary human (fire team leader)
 62 
Table 17.   Recommended update to MCTL 2.0. Adapted from USMC 
(2018a). 
MCT Title 
2.2 Collect Data and Intelligence 
2.2.1 Collect Tactical Reconnaissance 
2.2.2 Conduct Engineer Reconnaissance 
2.2.3 Conduct Terrain Reconnaissance 
2.2.4 Conduct Sensor Operations 
2.2.5 Conduct Aviation Intelligence Collection Activities 
2.2.6 Conduct Autonomous System Intelligence Collection Activities 
2.2.7 Collect Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 
2.2.8 Collect Combat and Intelligence Data 
2.2.9 Collect Medical Intelligence Data 
2.2.10 Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
2.2.11 Collect Tactical Intelligence on Ordnance and Munitions 
2.2.12 Collect Signals and Intelligence Data 
2.2.13 Conduct Armored Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
 
This is a natural location for the new task and requires simply the renumbering of 
the follow-on tasks depicted as 2.2.7-2.2.13 in Table 17. Table 18 depicts possible metrics 




Table 18.   Proposed metrics to evaluate task addition. Adapted from 
USMC (2018a). 
M1 Percent Of equipment ready and available to provide intelligence 
collection operations.   
M2 Y/N Product (sensor) dissemination/distribution network 
available. 
M3 Y/N Able to communicate relevant reconnaissance information 
using line-of-site (LOS)/beyond-line-of-site (BLOS) 
means. 
M4 Y/N Capable of employing visual observation to acquire 
intelligence information. 
M5 Y/N Capable of employing sensors to acquire intelligence 
information. 
M6 Y/N Capable of providing electronic reconnaissance. 
 
Table 18 adapts language associated with current MCT 2.2.5 Conduct Aviation 
Intelligence Collection Activities and applies it to the newly proposed 2.2.6 Conduct 
Autonomous System Intelligence Collection Activities. 
3. MOEs and MOPs 
The MOEs and MOPs are the baseline to determine mission readiness. The USMC 
relies on MCTL 2.0 as the guiding principles for evaluation of a unit towards their ability 
to conduct their assigned mission. The need to evaluate a machine is not currently well 
defined and must be considered as the USMC changes the approach to combat with the 
incorporation of machines on the battlefield. This analysis begins that process by 
establishing what would be considered the minimum essential metrics. 
The proposed changes to MCTL 2.0 are preliminary and based on theoretical 
abilities and requirements of the machine. The requirement to utilize a machine brings 
about the necessity to develop methods to evaluate the machine. Additionally, testing of 
the machine will bring about the need to update, change or delete some of the proposed 
adjustments. The need to reassess capabilities will be based on the proficiencies of the 
machine, requirements and restraints or constraints of the unit to which the machine is 
assigned. Consistently utilizing the principles of observability, predictability and 
directability is crucial to this endeavor. 
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It is clear that more detailed work will be required to fully adapt these changes to 
an effective interface. This can be done utilizing the framework presented in this thesis. 
For example, the recommended update to MCT 2.1.1.3 in Table 12 is a baseline for which 
additions can be made to fully incorporate the UxS.  M10 may be further elaborated to 
account for the ability of the UxS to transmit weather information in the area, obstacles, 
and man-made structures; these are just a few of the possibilities.  M11 can be expanded 
upon to include enemy location, size, and composition.  The need to fully incorporate and 
evaluate the UxS exists, however this is not a simple task.  There exists the requirement to 
determine who needs the information, how quickly they need it, and what method will be 
used to transmit the information. What do the receivers do with the information and is there 
an override feature that allows a small unit leader to prevent the transmission of it in certain 
circumstances?  Conducting further interdependence analysis will be useful in answering 
these types of questions.  The end result will be a more useful UxS for collaboration on the 
battlefield. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The need to change the ways by which the USMC fights has been identified by key 
leadership through their public statements and organizational documents such as the 
Marine Corps Operating Concept (2016d). The requirement is described in the Marine 
Operating Concept when it argues for us to “streamline our ability to evaluate and acquire 
advanced technologies to ensure we gain advantages from innovations faster than our 
competitors and adversaries” (USMC, 2016d, p. 5). This change will not be easily 
implemented due to the bureaucratic nature of the military. It is important to note though, 
the easiest way to implement change is through minimizing the disturbance to the 
organization. This is achieved by utilizing the doctrine that is already in place and accepted: 
MCTL 2.0. The groundwork for UTACC implementation is in place and needs only be 
modified. The proposed changes to MCTL 2.0 utilizes the foundation for evaluation and 
accounts for man-machine integration. This allows for the easiest method in which to 
incorporate machines for use in future conflict. 
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V.  SUMMARIZING RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This chapter summarizes the authors’ findings based on the collaboration of man-
machine teaming utilizing MCTs. The most beneficial way to evaluate machines within a 
USMC unit was determined to be through current methods, such as MCTL 2.0. The 
evaluation of MCTL 2.0 defined a number of machine tasks that could be accomplished. 
The tasks were modified to account for the implementation of a machine within the unit 
while enhancing team SA. The chapter will close with recommended follow on research 
that will guide future UTACC program development activities. 
A. SUMMARIZING RESULTS 
1. MOP and MOE Final Tables 
The tables provided in Chapter IV provide a baseline for evaluating a machine for 
implementation within a Marine unit.  The tables allow for objective evaluation of the 
machine, which provides a number of functions.  The evaluation ensures that the machine 
is capable, enhances mission capacity, and helps instill trust in the machines for the humans 
in the unit.  This provides evidence to ensure that the machine is a force multiplier on the 
battlefield. 
2. Limitations of MOP and MOE Tables 
MOP and MOE tables provide a baseline for collaboration between Marine and 
machine.  The ability to encompass the capabilities of a machine within a table, however, 
cannot provide all of the answers.  The greatest challenges that UTACC faces for man-
machine teaming are the operational environment, denied/restricted access to the 
electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, and unrealized complexities involved with human 
machine interaction.   
 The operational environment is constantly changing throughout a theater of armed 
conflict.  This may be the weather changing from day to day or the environment changing 
due to the military movements of operational forces.  No matter the reason, the machine 
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needs to adapt to the environment in which it is required to operate.  A MOP may be able 
to evaluate the machine in the desert environment, but may not have the same capability in 
the mountains.  This could be catastrophic if a machine is utilized in an environment that 
it has not been evaluated in.  The USMC does seek to train in environments that it intends 
to fight.  Therefore, this potential risk may be mitigated through normal training evolutions 
of deploying units.  The potential that exists for problems due to the environment, however, 
must not be overlooked. 
The USMC has had the luxury of operating in places that allowed for full and 
uncontested usage of the electromagnetic spectrum during recent conflicts.  This may not 
be the case in future endeavors.  In this case, there may be serious problems when using 
machines to enhance operational capabilities. Current methods to communicate rely 
heavily on the EM spectrum and the ability to utilize machines to increase SA provides a 
significant capability.  A denied EM spectrum environment would hinder the capacity of 
the machine to perform this function.  The questions become, what does the machine do 
for me now and how does this affect the complex interactions between man and 
machine?  This problem is not limited to the machine, but rather is a concern for the USMC 
as a whole.  For this reason it should not slow implementation, but needs to be considered 
while the USMC looks at the problem holistically.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Communication Methods 
The ability to communicate is a vital component to a successful military operation. 
Various communication methods have been successfully employed throughout the history 
of military operations. These methods range from word of mouth, radio communications, 
satellite communications, and various data transmission methods. The U.S. military has 
recently been able to use these communication methods with little resistance. The U.S. 
military’s freedom of movement in the electromagnetic spectrum will be challenged as 
technology continues to improve and is proliferated across the globe. The ability to 
communicate will continue to be vital in the future. The need to have an UxS with 
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redundant and resilient communication methods will play a significant role in future 
conflicts. The communication methods require significant research to be a strength of UxS.  
2. Communication Exchange beyond the Company Level 
This thesis focused on information exchange from the fire team to higher echelons 
of command. The authors, however, did not go beyond the company level. The types of 
information exchanged between higher levels of command needs evaluation. The types of 
information and the amount of information changes as it moves up the military hierarchy. 
Research should identify what the higher level commander requires and desires to make 
better informed decisions while not detracting from the mission at hand. A poor 
information exchange may degrade from the mission and result in the lack of UxS 
incorporation. 
3. Training and Readiness Manual Implementation 
The authors concentrated the efforts of this thesis on the MOPs and MOEs for UxS 
collaboration by evaluating MCTL 2.0. The MCTL 2.0, however, is a high level evaluation 
tool. The MOPs and MOEs should be further elaborated for implementation at the tactical 
level. Training and Readiness (T&R) manuals are used by units to measure their ability to 
accomplish subordinate tasks that contribute to their overall mission. The MOPs and MOEs 
for UxS need to be tailored to the T&R manual in the same manner. The suggested MOP 
changes, referenced by this thesis, need to be further refined to the T&R manual to ensure 
that implementation and evaluation is accomplished completely to the smallest tactical 
level. 
The concept of trust also repeatedly emerges throughout this thesis as being a 
necessity between humans and machines. We offer several different ways of understanding 
machine functions, that we suggest increases the trust a Marine has of the machine. There 
are, however, likely many other aspects of trust that should be researched in support of the 
UTACC program. For example, does a machine calibrate the level of trust it places in a 
human based on previous reliability?  Should trust be incorporated into a robot “T&R 
manual?”  Both questions that should be explored in the program. 
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C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The use of machines in combat is not a new concept within the United States 
military.  Machines have been helping to increase mission capability for hundreds of years, 
from the rifle to the tank to aircraft.  The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is a more 
recent example of successful machine integration on the battlefield.  The UAV increases 
capability in a similar manner to what a robot integrated within a USMC infantry unit can 
accomplish.  There are differences in the implementation of the ground robot.  Most 
notably is the close teaming and interactions between humans and robots at the small unit 
level. A UAV is operated by a team with standoff distance to increase survivability of the 
operators while conducting operations. 
A ground robot can provide similar capabilities as the UAV, however the UTACC 
robot cannot require a team to operate it.  This would degrade capabilities and take Marines 
out of the fight; this directly contradicts goals of the program.  The robot has to be a force 
multiplier to be an asset on the ground.  The principle is that the robot takes the place of a 
member within a fire team and perform the functions of the Marine that it replaced.  The 
force multiplier is that the robot can be loaded with sensors and capabilities that a Marine 
does not organically bring to bear against the adversary.  The robot can also be tasked to 
perform a task that has risks associated with it that would not make it feasible for a Marine 
to perform.  The need is best explained by the Marine Corps Operating Concept: “[l]earn 
how to use unmanned systems and automation at all echelons and in every domain-because 
mastering the man-machine interface offers a revolution in military operations” (USMC, 
2016d, p. 9). 
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